I've leaned toward critical realism for some time. By this I mean that there is not one level of reality, but many; that ideas have a reality, but not of existence in the same sense that matter and energy have existence; and that ideas themselves not only mediate existent objects and our subjective selves, but they are, themselves, mediated by signs, which have a different kind of reality (a socially and intentionally constructed reality) than either things, persons, or ideas.

Another, better term for ideas, here, is what Santayana called them: essences.

Meinong's theory of objects comes even closer to the truth, perhaps.

What a critical realist must come to understand, in my opinion, is not that ideas have reality, but that ideas can be in error, and be mere fantasies, or mere (mere!) useful contructs.

The reason to place the word critical before realism seems to be that many theories of realism were anything but realistic. They ascribed the wrong kind (or even too much!) reality to ideas. They did not accept that the objects of our thought can belong to several distinct levels of reality:

• existence
• subsistence
• givenness

That any object of thought can be valued

• positively, either highly or lowly, in this context or that
• considered inutile
• negatively, either lightly or darkly opposed

and that these values have a reality, too, but cannot be said to simply exist, but are reifications of functional relations between subject and object. Though we can say truthful things about these values, values are a different matter than truth; a value-relation is a separate relation from truth-relations.

And it gets very complicated.

Which is why putting the word critical in front of realism seems so responsible.

There are more things in reality than were dreamt of in earlier philosophies.

I cannot imagine that any of this is important for your average person. But most people come across arguments the effectiveness of which depend on not keeping the separate categories of reality distinct. The Ontological Argument, for example, is based on category errors, and among its several assumptions is the notion that essence implies existence, that a conception must refer to something real.

But of course, existence is not implied by essences, which can be fantasies (unicorns), or merely useful conceptual tools (numbers).

Of course, the fact that I use (misuse?) the term critical realism does not mean that I agree with everyone else who adopts that term. I feel free to use the terminology and basic materialistic perspective of George Santayana, add in the complexities of Alexius Meingong, interpret it using the semiotics of C. S. Peirce, and broaden up the domain of thought with the values theories of Ehrenfels, Perry, and the afforementioned Meinong, but with careful attention to the context of economics, with the ideas of Carl Menger, Ludwig von Mises, F. W. Taussig, Ludwig Lachmann and others thown in for good measure.

The question of BEING suggests many levels, to me:

1. existents




2. signs




3. the functions of signs (essences)



4. relations between concepts (allowing for truth)



5. valuations of any object of attention (values)

and you see how complicated reality gets. The list of separate levels of reality doesn't stop there. I didn't put up subject and object, for instance.

I would not be shocked if my view of reality does not fit in with modern-day critical realism. Metaphysics really ain't my bag. And yet it keeps drawing me back in.